The Supreme Court recently ruled that there is a 14 day time limit to a defendant’s Miranda rights.
Scott Greenfield has written about it, as has Orin Kerr.
Traversing the gap between "blog" and "blawg" since 2008.
The Supreme Court recently ruled that there is a 14 day time limit to a defendant’s Miranda rights.
Scott Greenfield has written about it, as has Orin Kerr.
Let me give you some background about myself: I’m more attuned to absorb broad knowledge than deep understanding. I can work at truly incisive wisdom about a topic, but my default mode is sound-bites and headlines. What can I say, at least I recognize it. For that reason, I was aware of some Supreme Court nominations and cases that came and went, but I had no more than a vague awareness that they were there.
Jeffrey Toobin’s The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court was a fascinating read. It gave me historical and legal background about the major Supreme Court cases of my time. It gave me historical and political background about the Supreme Court justices of my time. I found the style engaging and interesting, if a bit long winded. There were entirely too many occasions when I said to myself, “haven’t I read this before?” However, Toobin repeated entire passages for reasons — obviously he didn’t repeat himself by mistake — and it’s a nit-pick when viewing the entirety of the work.
There are critics of Toobin who claim he is too partisan one way or another; too pro or con one justice or another. I know that the Volokh Conspiracy in particular has issues with his views. They are probably right, but I wasn’t expecting an erudite treatise on constitutional law; I was expecting a description of the Supreme Court, and that’s exactly what I got.
Religious institutions hold a particular niche in our society. After all, America was founded on religious freedom (and turkey dinners). We have to respect each other’s religious beliefs, and a religious institution — such as a school — has the right to follow its tenets even in the face of Constitutionally protected rights. The question I find myself asking is: how steep is that slope?
Sure, a private, religious school can only accept students of the same faith; that’s a given. What about if the students are doing things the religion reviles? Can a Lutheran private school expel two girls for being suspected lesbians?
http://www.latimes.com/news/la-me-school28-2009jan28,0,3503114.story?track=rss
The truth is, there are two different issues at play here. One is the private ownership of the institutions; since the State is not officially involved, there is no Constitutional protection. Now, there are all sorts of arguments that any school, private or otherwise, should constitute “State actors”, but the current legal climate is that private schools are not subject to the State Action Doctrine.
The other issue is that a religious institution must be allowed to practice and adhere to its faith. To paraphrase Bill Cosby, “I know religion! I practice religion!” Are there aspects of most religions that those not within the faith would take offense at? Yes; hell, I know people in my religion who have a hard time with some of it.
Normally I would view a case like the one linked to above as correct since the person has two outs: she can choose to use a different school and she can choose not to take part in the offending religious practices (again by leaving the school by choice). However, since this is a school situation, and the student is notfree to make the choices I just mentioned, this decision does not sit soundly with me — but what are the alternatives?
I just finished Judge Richard Posner’s …Not a Suicide Pact. It is an intriguing and thought-provoking read — however, I’m left with a particularly partisan taste in my mouth.
I quite enjoyed the background and realistic perspective Posner offers on national security and fighting terrorism. The distinctions he draws between past threats and the current threat of global, unconventional terrorism are valid… to a point.
J. Posner lays out his exceptionally valid argument for why police procedures do not adequately meet national security against terrorism; he makes intelligent (if not convincing) arguments for both why and how civil liberties must be weighed against national security measures in times of national emergencies. He pays lip service to civil libertarians but dismisses them, ultimately terming their views “excessive” and “irresponsible”, but that is to be expected; after all, he hardly expects to convince any libertarians with his arguments. The biggest warning flag was in the conclusion, a passage that was reminiscent of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Boumediene:
Though scattered by our invasion of Afghanistan and by our stepped-up efforts at counterterrorism, terrorist leaders may even now be regrouping, and preparing an attack that will produce destruction on a scale to dwarf 9/11.(p.148)
Compare that passage to Scalia’s:
I think it appropriate to begin with a description of the disastrous consequences of what the Court has done today… It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed… The Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today.
Why, must they resort to base fear mongering? I thought that was the exclusive jurisdiction of the media.
I would still suggest this book — it is an interesting read and at least gives excellent jumping off points for thinking the issues through yourself.
UPDATE — 1/1/09 –
I realized late last night that I failed to make any mention of the actual point of the book.
J. Posner points out many times that his main thesis in the book is that many of the “curtailments” of civil liberties in times of national emergencies are, in fact, constitutional. To his credit, he stipulates that just being constitutional does not necessarily make something morally correct.
The constitutional issues he raises and attempts to put to rest waver right on the edge — dependent on how you view the constitution and the importance of the framers’ intent. I compared his views to Justice Scalia’s earlier; those similarities exist only so far as their agreement about the danger of terrorism. I’m sure Scalia would have choice words regarding Posner’s view that:
Language and drafters’ intent are not the only or even, in my judgment, the best guides to constitutional rule making; they are merely the most orthodox ones.
That being said, I feel that Posner’s view is a much more practical and realistic one than Scalia’s; I simply disagree with the extent of some of the conclusions in this book.